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In this thesis, we study two topics related to defaults. First, we provide a Probability
of Default (PD) calculation method for privately-held U.S. regional banks, using free and
transparent data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Our method is
efficient and useful for both investors and regulators. We have improved Moody’s proprietary
RiskCalc PD model [17] by creating a new cautionary index, which is able to capture default
behaviors very well and has a very high predictive power over both one-year and six-month
time horizons as shown by our numerical results. We also find that this performance is
robust over different historical periods. We describe the factors we chose, the modeling
methodology, and the model’s accuracy in detail.
Second, we propose two strategies to reduce the frequency of defaults in home mortgages
(foreclosures). The first is a new mortgage insurance contract (American put option with the
house as the underlying asset). Our analysis differs from that for the standard put option in
equity markets in that our strike (the remaining value of the mortgage) is time dependent,
and the drift and volatility in the Geometric Brownian Motion are time dependent (step
functions) due to a regime switch from declining to increasing house prices. Both theoretical
derivations and numerical results will be obtained. We will also analyze the Adjustable
Balance Mortgage (ABM) in continuous time as a second alternative to avoiding foreclosures.
Here the mortgage payments are reduced if the house price falls below the remaining value
of the mortgage.
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American Put Option, Integral Equation, Early Exercise Boundary, Default Probability,
Adjustable Balance Mortgage.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the first part of the thesis, we provide a Probability of Default (PD) calculation method
for privately-held U.S. regional banks, using free and transparent data from the FDIC. We
cleaned the data, and applied a bidirectional stepwise logistic regression model to choose the
best predictors out of eight predictors at each quarter t. Based on the corresponding esti-
mated regression coefficients among all quarters, we choose the most important predictors.
The final model for the PD estimation for all the banks requires only four predictors, and
we do stepwise logistic regression on these four predictors. In order to check the predictive
power, we apply the estimated coefficients from quarter t to quarter t + 1. We then assess
the goodness-of-fit of the model by three summary measures at each quarter: Area Under
the ROC Curve, KS Statistic, and Bad Capture Rate in the Bottom Percentile. The results
are shown to be very good for all quarters. We repeat this at each quarter and for different
default horizons (1 year and 6 months). The ultimate cautionary index we create is a linear
combination of the four predictors, where the weights are the actual coefficients of the cor-
responding significant predictors from the stepwise logistic regression deriving from the four
significant predictors at each quarter. At time t, we set a subjective barrier (or cut-off level)
based on the sorted cautionary index. We pick the barrier to be the index value such that
the Bad Capture Rate Below The Barrier is at least 0.9 at time t (note that banks below
the barrier, i.e., those with index value greater than the barrier, are those banks with high
PD). We then carry over the coefficients as well as the barrier, and use them to predict 1
year in the future, out of sample, which defaults result; i.e. we apply the barrier from time t
to time t+ 1, and check the Bad Capture Rate Below The Barrier at time t+ 1. The results
prove to be very good. Most of the Bad Capture Rate Below The Barrier at time t + 1 are
greater than 0.9 for both 1 year and 6 months time horizons.
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In summary, we have created a new cautionary index that improves on the proprietary
Moody’s model. It is capable of capturing the default behavior of risky banks with high
predictive power. It should be quite useful to both the FDIC that regulates regional banks
and for investors.
In the second part of the thesis we study two strategies to avoid defaults of home mortgages
(foreclosures). The first is a new mortgage insurance contract, offering the mortgage holder
an option to exchange the house for the remaining value of the mortgage, with no credit
consequences. Essentially this new financial instrument is an American put option with the
house as the underlying asset and the remaining value of the mortgage as the strike. The new
technical features that arise are that the strike in the intrinsic value of the put option and
the drift and volatility in the Geometric Brownian Motion are time dependent. The early
exercise boundary, the value of the American put option, and the survival probabilities are
calculated in both non-regime switching (falling house prices) and regime switching (falling
followed by rising house prices) scenarios. We also study adjustable balance mortgages in
continuous time. This second strategy allows the homeowner to pay a reduced mortgage
payment if the house price falls below the remaining value of the mortgage.
In summary, these new financial instruments minimize the need to use the legal foreclosure
system to deal with the economic risk of house price declines. By reducing the frequency of
foreclosure, they benefit both the mortgage holders and the mortgage lenders. The mortgage
holder does not suffer the adverse future credit impact from a foreclosure and the mortgage
lender is not forced to hold a non-performing loan and to acquire a devalued property.
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2.0 DEFAULTS OF PRIVATE REGIONAL BANKS
2.1 BACKGROUND
Regional banks play a central role in providing loans to businesses and farms, mainly for
real estate. As a result, when there is a catastrophe in the real estate market, this affects
the banks. It not only affects the investors of the banks, but also results in difficulties for
the FDIC that regulates these banks. Specifically, the FDIC must become involved in the
receivership process, pay for the insured deposits, and attempt to find buyers of the defaulted
banks. There are more than 6,000 community banks in the U.S., representing 93% of all
lenders in the country, and accounting for 45% of all small loans to businesses and farms.
Many privately-held U.S. regional banks failed during the recent financial crisis, causing
problems for investors and regulators.
Moody’s RiskCalc PD model methodology document [17], states that their RiskCalc for
U.S. Banks performs better at predicting bank failures than other publicly available models.
However, the method is not transparent and it is almost impossible to replicate Moody’s
results. Additionally, Moody’s data is proprietary and it is very expensive to subscribe to
their service to get PD estimations.
The objective in this first part of the dissertation is to provide a PD calculation method for
privately-held U.S. regional banks, using free and transparent data, which is efficient and
accurate for both investors and regulators, and has a better predictive power than Moody’s
method. An immediate problem is that private banks provide very little information relative
to publicly traded banks for which huge amounts of equity and bond information is available
from the market. For private banks, the only information which is available is that found in
their quarterly reports to the FDIC. This will be used to calculate the predictors, which, in
3
turn, will be used in the logistic regression model to develop our new cautionary index.
In summary, in our model only free and transparent data is used. In addition, we have
improved Moody’s model by creating a new cautionary index, capable of capturing the
default behavior with high predictive power.
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.2.1 Previous Related Work On Bank Default Modeling
Bank failures have stronger adverse effects on economic activity than other business failures
as pointed out by Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan [11]. The spill over effect of bank panic
or systemic risk has a multiplier effect on all banks and financial institutions leading to a
greater effect of bank failure in the economy. As a result, banking institutions are typically
subjected to rigorous regulation, and bank failures are of major public policy concern in
countries across the world. During 1984-1993, there was a significant increase in the number
of individual bank failures and acquisitions in the United States. Also, the 2008 financial
crisis led to the failure of a large number of banks in the United States. The FDIC closed
465 failed banks from 2008 to 2012. Therefore, quantitative models now become more and
more important since it not only helps the regulators to narrow the scope in the detection
of financially weak institutions, but also it assists investors to identify bad investments.
The literature on forecasting bankruptcy and firm failure dates back to the 1960s. Altman
[1] provides a summary through the early 1990s. The vast majority of these studies rely
upon discriminant analysis, probit/logit models, and time-varying hazard analysis (or its
variants). Bovenzi, Marino and McFadden [3] estimate PD for U.S. federally insured com-
mercial banks by applying probit statistical analysis. Three models were developed based
on different selected variables, where the variables account for the inherent risks in the com-
mercial bank lines of business (i.e., credit risk, portfolio diversification, internal controls,
operative inefficiencies, capitalization, and interest rates). Each model outputs classification
accuracy at various threshold levels. Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan [10] built a logit model to
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estimate PD within the next two years for Fed-supervised banks, using a set of financial ra-
tios focusing on capital adequacy, asset quality, management competence, earnings strength,
liquidity risk and market risk. Eventually, fourteen financial ratios were defined as relevant
in predicting PD. The ratios are: total equity to total assets, non-performing loans to total
loans, consumer loans to total assets, other real estate owned to total loans, non interest
expense to total revenue, insider loans to total assets, occupancy expense to average assets,
return on assets, interest income accrued to total loans, liquid assets to total assets, large
time deposits to total assets, core deposits to total assets, natural logarithm of total assets,
and total assets to total assets in the parent-holding company.
2.2.2 Contribution
Our PD calculation method for privately-held U.S. regional banks differs from these previous
studies in a number of directions. First, only free and transparent data from the FDIC
are used. Second, we improved Moody’s proprietary RiskCalc PD model by creating a
new cautionary index, which is able to capture default behaviors very well and has a very
high predictive power over both one-year and six-month time horizon. Third, our model
performance is robust over different historical periods.
2.3 MODELING AND ANALYSIS
2.3.1 Input Data
Since we focus on privately-held U.S. regional banks, their quarterly financial statements
are the only information available to us. We downloaded raw data files from the FDIC’s
database. There are 62 “.csv” files at each quarter, and there are 46 quarters, so in total we
have 2,852 files. Figure 1 shows a list of the reports during the quarter ending on 9/30/2008.
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Figure 1: Sample reports on 9/30/2008
As an example, “All Reports 20080930 Assets and Liabilities.csv” is an 8,393 by
89 matrix, whose snapshot is in Figure 2. It provides a great deal of information such as the
bank ID, address, as well as the quantitative numbers of interest in this analysis.
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Figure 2: Assets and liabilities .csv file on 9/30/2008 snapshot
7
Using Moody’s research on bank PD modeling [17] as a guide, we initially constrained
our approach to eight ratios specific to the banking industry, seven of which are directly from
Moody’s research: Equity Capital/Assets, Commercial Real Estate Loans/Assets,
Construction Loans/Assets, C&I Loans/Assets, Government Securities/Assets,
Net Interest Margin, Net Income/Assets. However, not all of them will turn out to
be useful in our cautionary index. We will also require another called Texas Ratio (TR).
In the beginning of this research, we thought the TR would be sufficient by itself to be
the cautionary index. However, it turned out not to be as effective as we required. This
accounted for the addition of some of the ratios from Moody’s. “Equity Capital/Assets”,
“Construction Loans/Assets”, “Net Income/Assets”, along with “TR” ultimately developed
from our analysis as the significant factors during the recent real estate crisis which caused
the regional banks to default. The definition of these four factors are:
Equity Capital/Assets: = (Total Assets−Liability)/Total Assets. Assets are defined as
anything that a business owns, has value and can be converted to cash. The equity capital
is all of this money minus the liabilities, things which the bank must pay out.
Construction Loans/Assets: Construction Loans include loans for all property types un-
der construction, as well as loans for land acquisition and development. Because this was a
real estate crisis, the construction loans which are not performing can cause a great deal of
harm to the bank. Our model identifies this ratio to be significant as well.
Net Income/Assets: A company’s total profit as a percentage of total assets.
Texas Ratio: = Non−performing Loans + Real Estate Owned
Tangible Common Equity Capital + Loan Loss Reserves
The four components in TR are defined below:
Non-performing Loans: Loans that are delinquent.
Real Estate Owned: Property owned by a bank after an unsuccessful sale at a foreclosure
auction.
Tangible Common Equity: a measure of a company’s capital which can be used to evaluate
its ability to deal with potential losses. This is an important factor in determining insolvency
from any cause.
Loan Loss Reserves: money that the bank set aside in anticipation of some loans going bad.
Thus if we are to have a cautionary index, with a high value indicating a high default prob-
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ability, then TR should have a positive coefficient, Equity Capital/Assets should have a
negative coefficient, Construction Loans/Assets should have a positive coefficient, and Net
Income/Assets should have a negative coefficient. The 4 predictors will be selected from our
statistical analysis as being significant, and therefore will be the ones used in our cautionary
index.
From the FDIC’s raw database, we have 9,873 U.S. regional banks’ quarterly financial state-
ments data from Q4 2002 to Q1 2014. However, not all of the data can be used in a consistent
manner to do the statistical analysis. Some of them have missing data while others have data
which have been corrupted, giving the wrong kinds of numbers. In the end, after data pre-
processing and filtering steps, there are 6,081 healthy banks and 416 default banks, ranging
from Q4 2002 to Q1 2014. We believe this is a good sample.
2.3.2 Multiple Logistic Regression
The previous section provides an idea of the data and the factors that will be used to develop
our cautionary index. We will build the cautionary index using logistic regression.
2.3.2.1 Introduction
Let pi denote the probability in favor of a binary event, and the probability against the
event is therefore 1 − pi. The odds in favor of the event is defined as the ratio of the
two, i.e. odds = pi
1−pi . The natural logarithm of the odds is called the logit function, i.e.
logit(pi) = ln(odds) = ln( pi
1−pi ). Note that while the odds is strictly positive, the logit can
take any real value. The logit function forms the basis for logistic regression. The model
can be stated as follows:
Consider a collection of p predictors denoted by the vector x′ = (x1, x2, ..., xp). Let the
conditional probability that the event will happen (a bank defaults) be denoted by P (Y =
1|x) = pi(x). The logit of the multiple logistic regression model is given by the equation
logit(pi(x)) = ln
(
pi(x)
1− pi(x)
)
= g(x) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βpxp (2.3.1)
which implies that
E(Y |x) = P (Y = 1|x) = pi(x) = e
g(x)
1 + eg(x)
=
eβ0+β1x1+β2x2+...+βpxp
1 + eβ0+β1x1+β2x2+...+βpxp
(2.3.2)
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2.3.2.2 Fitting the Multiple Logistic Regression
Assume that we have a sample of n independent observations (xi, yi) , i = 1, 2, ..., n. Fit-
ting the multiple logistic regression model requires that we obtain estimates of the vector
β′ = (β0, β1, ..., βp). The estimation method we applied here is maximum likelihood. The
likelihood function is
l(β) =
n∏
n=1
pi(xi)
yi [1− pi(xi)]1−yi (2.3.3)
Thus the log likelihood is
L(β) = ln [l(β)] =
n∑
i=1
{yi ln [pi(xi)] + (1− yi) ln [1− pi(xi)]} (2.3.4)
The procedure here is to use the maximum likelihood method to find the coefficients of
the predictors as well as the intercept. The p + 1 likelihood equations are obtained by dif-
ferentiating the log likelihood function with respect to the p + 1 coefficients. There is no
analytic solution for these equations, so solving them requires numerical methods and soft-
ware packages. We use the statistical software R to get the maximum likelihood estimators
βˆ
′
=
(
βˆ0, βˆ1, ..., βˆp
)
.
2.3.3 Model Selection
We are motivated by wanting to balance goodness of fit and penalization for model com-
plexity.
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
The smaller the value of AIC, the better the model.
AIC = −2LogLikelihood+ 2(p+ 1)
= −2 ln
(
L(βˆ0, ...βˆp, σˆ
2|Y )
)
+ 2(p+ 1)
(2.3.5)
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Bayes Information Criterion (BIC):
The smaller the value of BIC, the better the model.
BIC = −2LogLikelihood+ (p+ 1) ln(n)
= −2 ln
(
L(βˆ0, ...βˆp, σˆ
2|Y )
)
+ (p+ 1) ln(n)
(2.3.6)
Since AIC performs well with large sample size, as is our case, we chose minimizing AIC as
our criterion.
Moreover, there are many procedures for arriving at this optimal choice of the weighting
factors.
Types of Selection Processes in Stepwise Regression:
Forward Selection
Start with no potential predictors; At each step, add the predictor for which the resulting
model has lowest value of AIC; Stop when AIC begins to increase.
Backward Elimination
Start with all potential predictors; At each step, delete the predictor that results in the
lowest value of AIC; Stop when AIC begins to increase.
Forward & Backward Selection (Bidirectional Elimination)
Do one step of forward selection; Do one step of backward elimination; Repeat until no
predictors can be added or removed, and the resulting AIC is the smallest.
We choose the Forward & Backward Selection.
2.3.4 Evaluating Model Performance
After doing this, we will evaluate the model performance using some common metrics.
2.3.4.1 Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC)
The Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is a plot which illustrates the perfor-
mance of a binary classifier system as its discrimination threshold is varied. It is created
by plotting the true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR), at various
threshold settings. TPR is also known as sensitivity, which defines how many correct pos-
itive results occur among all positive samples available during the test. FPR is one minus
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the specificity or true negative rate, which defines how many incorrect positive results occur
among all negative samples available during the test.
sensitivity = TPR =
TP
P
=
TP
TP + FN
(2.3.7)
specificity = TNR =
TN
N
=
TN
FP + TN
= 1− FPR (2.3.8)
In our case,
TP: defaulted banks correctly predict as default
FP: healthy banks incorrectly predict as default
TN: healthy banks correctly predict as healthy
FN: defaulted banks incorrectly predict as healthy
To draw a ROC curve, only TPR and FPR are needed. The ROC curve plots parametrically
TPR(T ) versus FPR(T ) with T as the varying threshold (decision) parameter (all possible
cut-off points) and illustrates the performance of a binary classifier system as its discrimina-
tion threshold is varied. The ROC curve is also known as the trade-off curve because it shows
the trade-off between goods and bads - the percentage of total bads that must be accepted
in order to obtain a given percentage of total goods. The area under the ROC curve (AUC),
which ranges from 0.5 to 1, provides a measure of the likelihood that an observation which
has Y = 1 will have a higher P (Y = 1) than an observation which has Y = 0. The idea is
to have this curve as steep as possible and have this AUC being as close to 1 as possible, as
a way of indicating our methods are performing well.
Figure 3: Four prediction examples.
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Figure 4: The ROC space and plots of the above four prediction examples.
Figure 5: ROC curve intuition.
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2.3.4.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov(KS) Statistic (or KS measure)
The KS statistic is a widely accepted measure to evaluate the performance of a logistic
regression. It gives the separation power a model exhibits between 0’s and 1’s. We want
our model to assign higher PD to banks that eventually default than to banks that do not.
The KS statistic is defined as the maximum difference between the cumulative percent good
distribution and the cumulative percent bad distribution, i.e.
FG(PD) = CDF of the good observations
FB(PD) = CDF of the bad observations
KS = supPD |FB(PD)− FG(PD)|
Theoretically, the KS statistic is a number ranging from 0 to 1. The higher the KS statistic,
the better the separation power our model has.
A good graphical example of the K-S Statistic is in the credit lending business, which can be
seen in Figure 6. The lending bank judges the credit quality of a person by the applicant’s
score which is derived from certain models. In this illustration, the greatest separability
between the two distribution functions occurs at a score of approximately 0.7. Using this
score, if all applicants who scored above 0.7 were accepted and all applicants scoring below
0.7 were rejected, then approximately 80% of all “good” applicants would be accepted, while
only 35% of all “bad” applicants would be accepted. The measure of separability, or the K-S
test result would be 45% (80%-35%).
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Figure 6: A graphical example of a KS Statistic.
2.3.4.3 Bad Capture Rate in the Bottom Percentile
The bad capture rate is a concept which is a more appropriate for the present analysis.
What we are trying to do is to set some threshold above which we can capture the highest
proportion of the banks which actually defaulted, without having too many false positives.
This measure focuses on the bottom of the PD distribution (the highest PDs). The bad
capture rate corresponding to the bottom percentage of all banks is defined as the number
of default banks captured in the bottom percentile divided by the total number of defaulted
banks. The higher the bad capture rate, the better the classification power of our model. We
might choose the bottom 0.1%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, or 50% as the cutoff. For example,
if we have 6,000 banks in total at time t, then the bottom 1% will be the 60(=6,000*1%)
banks whose estimated PDs from our model are the largest 1% among those banks. The bad
capture rate corresponding to the bottom 1% is defined as the number of defaulted banks
captured in the bottom 60 banks divided by the total number of defaulted banks.
2.3.4.4 How To Choose An Appropriate Bottom Percentile
As we increase the bottom percentile, the bad capture rate will increase and finally reach
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1 (this happens after we capture all the default banks but we also have captured many
successful banks). As mentioned previously, we want a higher bad capture rate, which is an
increasing function of the bottom percentile. At the same time, as we increase the bottom
percentile, the ratio between the number of healthy banks within the bottom and the number
of defaulted banks within the bottom increases. This ratio is a measure of how many good
banks must be observed in order to capture the bad banks. Of course, we want this ratio to
be small. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the good over bad ratio and bad capture
rate. So we must determine a rule to choose an appropriate bottom percentile.
2.4 RESULTS
In summary, we used cleaned FDIC data, performed bidirectional stepwise logistic regression
using AIC as the criterion, and evaluated the model performance by the above three metrics.
We apply the stepwise logistic regression model to choose the best predictors out of the eight
predictors at each quarter t. Based on the corresponding estimated regression coefficients
among all quarters, we choose the most important four predictors.
Our final model for the PD estimation for all the banks uses only these four predictors. We
then do stepwise logistic regression on these four predictors.
Table 4 and Table 5 in the Appendix summarize the stepwise logistic regression coefficients
in each quarter for 1 year default time horizon. Table 6 and Table 7 in the Appendix provide
the same summary for 6 months default horizon.
Note that in the tables, the header β0 corresponds to the intercept in the regression, and
β1, ..., β8 correspond to the coefficients of Texas Ratio, Equity Capital/Assets, Commercial
Real Estate Loans/Assets, Construction Loans/Assets, C&I Loans/Assets, Government Se-
curities/Assets, Net Interest Margin, and Net Income/Assets.
In each quarter, regardless of the p-values, the intercept, β0, is retained. For each factor, if
the p-value is less than 0.05, it is retained as significant. A blank indicates that the p-value
for this factor was larger than 0.05 and hence was insignificant in this quarter. One notices
that TR, EC/A, CL/A, and NI/A are significant with higher frequency than the other fac-
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tors.
Based on these results, we maintain that the four most important predictors for both 1 year
and 6 months default time horizons are Texas Ratio, Equity Capital/Assets, Construction
Loans/Assets, and Net Income/Assets.
Using only these factors, we recalculate the coefficients using stepwise logistic regression at
each time t, using the information about the banks which have defaulted in a 1 year (or 6
months) time horizon. We then use the calculated coefficients 1 year (or 6 months) later to
check their effectiveness, i.e. we apply the coefficients estimated from time t to predict at
time t + 1. We then assess the goodness-of-fit of the model by the summary measures at
time t+ 1. We find this to be very good for all quarters. We repeat this at each quarter and
for different default horizons (1 year and 6 months).
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Table 1: Logistic regression predictive power summary by the selected four predictors: apply
coefficients estimated from 20080930 to 20090930, 1 year default horizon
Start Quarter t 20080930
Default Horizon 1 year
Apply to t+1 20090930
Number of Defaults at t 90
Number of Defaults at t+1 147
Stepwise Logistic Regression AIC 471.86
ROC Curve AUC At Time t+1 0.977
KS Statistic At Time t+1 0.917
Bottom Percentage 0.1% 1.0% 5.0% 10.0% 20.0% 40.0% 50.0%
Bad Capture Rate t 6.7% 44.4% 85.6% 90.0% 94.4% 96.7% 97.8%
Bad Capture Rate t+1 4.1% 38.1% 89.8% 97.3% 97.3% 98.0% 98.6%
Table 1 summarizes the detailed stepwise logistic regression predictive power, where we
apply coefficients estimated from 9/30/2008 data to the data on 9/30/2009 using a 1 year
default horizon. We found that the AUC is good and the KS statistic is very close to 1 as
well. The most significant result is the bad capture rate. This is the bad capture rate in
sample, at 5% cut off. When we use the coefficients from time t to t+ 1 (out of sample), we
get essentially the same efficiency.
It is clear that to obtain a 98.6% bad capture rate at time t + 1 requires observing 3,233
banks which is too expensive. On the other hand, by setting the bottom percentage at 5%
(observing 323 banks) or 10% (observing 647 banks) we capture (identify) between 89.8%
and 97.3% of the 147 banks that will fail one year later. The results for other quarters during
the housing crisis are similar.
The new cautionary index we create is a linear combination of the 4 predictors, where
the weights are the actual coefficients of the corresponding significant predictors from the
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stepwise logistic regression deriving from the four significant predictors at each quarter. At
time t, we set a subjective barrier (or cut-off level) based on the sorted cautionary index. We
pick the barrier to be the index value such that the Bad Capture Rate Below The Barrier is
at least 0.9 at time t (note that banks below the barrier are those with index value greater
than the barrier, which are those banks with high PD). Then we carry over the coefficients as
well as the barrier, and use them to predict 1 year hence out of sample what the results are
going to be, i.e. we apply the barrier from time t to time t+ 1, and check the Bad Capture
Rate Below The Barrier at time t+ 1. Table 2 and Table 3 show the detailed results which
prove to be very good: most of the Bad Capture Rate Below The Barrier at time t + 1 are
greater than 0.9 for both 1 year and 6 months time horizons. Table 2 provides a summary
of the analysis. What is important here is that starting about Q3 2007, there are significant
numbers of defaults. They continue for a considerable time, until sometime around 2012.
One sees that during late 2007 and early 2008 the number of healthy banks divided by the
number of default banks below the barrier is much too high. There are too many banks
to monitor in order to find the banks which actually default. However as one continues
to Q3 2009, one sees there are only 285 banks to be monitored to capture 75 banks that
defaulted. So in the period when there are significant defaults due to the real estate collapse,
the number of healthy banks divided by the number of defaults on the bottom percentile
(which gives the indication of how good the method is) starts to decrease to around 2, as
opposed to 32.8 in year 2007.
The same observations apply to the 6 months default horizon (Table 3). Again the ratio of
decreases from 152.8 to approximately 2 during the housing crisis. One notices, in addition,
that the ratio jumps back up to 13 in the third quarter of 2013, indicating that perhaps the
housing crisis is over.
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Table 2: 1 year default horizon summary by using barrier on the cautionary index
t Apply to
t+1
Barrier
(Weighted
Index) at
t
# of
Banks
On
The
Bot-
tom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
De-
faults
On
The
Bot-
tom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
Healthy
On
The
Bot-
tom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
Healthy/#
of De-
faults
On The
Bottom
Percentile
at t+1
# of
De-
fault
at t+1
Bad Cap-
ture Rate
On The
Bottom
Percentile
at t+1
2007.9.30 2008.9.30 0.7424893 2911 86 2825 32.8488372 90 0.95555556
2007.12.31 2008.12.31 0.9900067 1403 116 1287 11.0948276 118 0.98305085
2008.3.31 2009.3.30 -2.657913 1072 131 941 7.18320611 135 0.97037037
2008.6.30 2009.6.30 -3.769981 1624 148 1476 9.97297297 154 0.96103896
2008.9.30 2009.9.30 -1.474294 773 143 630 4.40559441 147 0.97278912
2008.12.31 2009.12.31 -3.05916 427 131 296 2.25954198 134 0.97761194
2009.3.31 2010.3.31 -5.355394 439 111 328 2.95495495 117 0.94871795
2009.6.30 2010.6.30 -2.854472 340 90 250 2.77777778 94 0.95744681
2009.9.30 2010.9.30 -4.121945 285 75 210 2.8 78 0.96153846
2009.12.31 2010.12.31 -2.300902 171 62 109 1.75806452 66 0.93939394
2010.3.31 2011.3.31 -4.338152 196 59 137 2.3220339 61 0.96721311
2010.6.30 2011.6.30 -4.126456 200 57 143 2.50877193 59 0.96610169
2010.9.30 2011.9.30 -4.090674 155 49 106 2.16326531 51 0.96078431
2010.12.31 2011.12.31 -3.47596 131 44 87 1.97727273 45 0.97777778
2011.3.31 2012.3.31 -3.90407 97 33 64 1.93939394 35 0.94285714
2011.6.30 2012.6.30 -4.604535 102 27 75 2.77777778 28 0.96428571
2011.9.30 2012.9.30 -3.479197 57 21 36 1.71428571 23 0.91304348
2011.12.31 2012.12.31 -2.485187 47 16 31 1.9375 19 0.84210526
2012.3.31 2013.3.31 -4.590071 54 15 39 2.6 19 0.78947368
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Table 3: 6 months default horizon summary by using barrier on the cautionary index
t Apply to
t+1
Barrier
(Weighted
Index) at
t
# of
Banks
On The
Bottom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
Defaults
On The
Bottom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
Healthy
On The
Bottom
Per-
centile
at t+1
# of
Healthy/#
of De-
faults
On The
Bottom
Percentile
at t+1
# of
De-
fault
at t+1
Bad Cap-
ture Rate
On The
Bottom
Percentile
at t+1
2007.9.30 2008.3.31 0.5291853 1384 9 1375 152.777778 9 1
2007.12.31 2008.6.30 0.5787903 688 16 672 42 16 1
2008.3.31 2008.9.30 -7.557068 1550 26 1524 58.6153846 28 0.92857143
2008.6.30 2008.12.31 -2.144762 585 38 547 14.3947368 39 0.97435897
2008.9.30 2009.3.31 -4.485205 1299 60 1239 20.65 62 0.96774194
2008.12.31 2009.6.30 -2.705297 259 70 189 2.7 79 0.88607595
2009.3.31 2009.9.30 -3.043753 230 66 164 2.48484848 73 0.90410959
2009.6.30 2009.12.31 -3.351872 472 73 399 5.46575342 75 0.97333333
2009.9.30 2010.3.31 -5.585763 273 72 201 2.79166667 74 0.97297297
2009.12.31 2010.6.30 -1.90663 105 57 48 0.84210526 59 0.96610169
2010.3.31 2010.9.30 -3.245775 109 39 70 1.79487179 43 0.90697674
2010.6.30 2010.12.31 -5.350716 98 31 67 2.16129032 35 0.88571429
2010.9.30 2011.3.31 -2.355462 67 30 37 1.23333333 35 0.85714286
2010.12.31 2011.6.30 -4.127371 117 30 87 2.9 31 0.96774194
2011.3.31 2011.9.30 -6.396689 84 24 60 2.5 26 0.92307692
2011.6.30 2011.12.31 -3.252554 53 24 29 1.20833333 28 0.85714286
2011.9.30 2012.3.31 -5.419467 74 23 51 2.2173913 25 0.92
2011.12.31 2012.6.30 -2.360364 18 13 5 0.38461538 17 0.76470588
2012.3.31 2012.9.30 -5.042031 32 10 22 2.2 10 1
2012.6.30 2012.12.31 -3.628586 49 11 38 3.45454545 11 1
2012.9.30 2013.3.31 -3.341269 9 7 2 0.28571429 13 0.53846154
2012.12.31 2013.6.30 -4.181472 9 4 5 1.25 8 0.5
2013.3.31 2013.9.30 -6.568359 84 6 78 13 6 1
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3.0 DEFAULTS ON HOME MORTGAGES
3.1 BACKGROUND
The second problem of this dissertation concerns defaults in home mortgages, which are
related to the collapse of the real estate market. The homeowner who defaults on his home
mortgage later suffers credit consequences from the default.
In this work we explore two different ways to avoid mortgage defaults when housing prices
decline. One way is to create a mortgage insurance that allows the buyer to stop paying the
mortgages and walk away without any credit consequences. Another is to consider a different
type of mortgage that allows the mortgage holders to pay less when the house prices decline.
Firstly, we propose a new mortgage insurance contract (American put option with the house
as the underlying asset). By reducing the role of the legal system in mitigating house price
risk, this new financial instrument minimizes the need to use the legal foreclosure system to
deal with the economic risk of house price declines. Secondly, we will price the adjustable
balance mortgage in continuous time.
Historically, the housing market was on its way up from 2003 to 2006, and then there was a
significant drop during the period 2006 and 2012. Data during this period was provided by
Zillow, the real estate database company. In order to preserve the anonymity of the individual
homeowners, they provided only the average house prices. Table 8 in the Appendix is Zillow’s
data from Paradise, Las Vegas. We will use the data to model the evolution of house prices
during 1997 to 2013.
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Figure 7: Average monthly house prices in Paradise, Las Vegas
We plotted the data in Figure 7 and found the following: in phase 1 from 1997 through
2003, there is a normal increase in house prices, and then quite suddenly in 2003 there is a
phenomenal increase during which many jumped into the housing market. Then, starting in
2006 for 6 years house prices had a significant drop. Finally, in early 2012 house prices start
rising modestly, more or less at the same level as back in 1997.
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.2.1 Previous Related Work On Home Mortgage Default
Ciurlia and Gheno [6] present a two-factor model where the real estate asset value and the
spot rate dynamics are jointly modeled in order to take into account the real estate market
sensitivity to the interest rate term structure. The pricing problem for both European
and American options is then analyzed and a discrete-time bi-dimensional binomial lattice
framework is adopted. However, in this paper, only the price of the option is calculated
numerically. No analytic approximation is derived and no foreclosure probability is derived.
Kuo [15] criticizes [6] on the use of geometric Brownian motion. The author proposes a
polynomial approximation method to value the mortgage default option. The author uses
actual transaction data to estimate a more realistic price process and applies the empirically
estimated house price model to value the default option rather than assuming the house price
to be a random walk process. The author sets up a house price model with three return
components: i.e., the AR(1) market return, the AR(1) persistent idiosyncratic error, and
the time-independent transaction error. However, the data set being used is too old which
is from a paper by Case and Shiller [8]. Also, only the price of mortgage default option has
been calculated. No default probability is derived.
Gelain and Lansing [9] investigate the behavior of the equilibrium price-rent ratio for housing
in a standard asset pricing model and compare the model predictions to survey evidence on
the return expectations of real-world housing investors. The authors show that if agents in
the model employ simple moving-average forecast rules, they tend to expect higher future
returns when house prices are high relative to fundamentals. This paper only discusses the
mean-reversion property of house price itself. However, it does not discuss the options on
houses, including prices and default probabilities.
Krainer, LeRoy, and O [16] develop an equilibrium valuation model that incorporates optimal
default to show how mortgage yields and lender recovery rates on defaulted mortgages depend
on initial loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. The analysis treats both the frictionless case and the
case in which borrowers and lenders incur deadweight costs upon default. As the model
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(or common sense) predicts, high-LTV mortgages are more prone to default than low-LTV
mortgages. Further, the dependence of mortgage pricing on LTV conforms to the prediction
of the model. This paper only analyzes the effect of LTV on default and mortgage pricing.
However, it does not discuss the options on houses.
Willen, Foote, Gerardi, and Goette [21] from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston discuss
possible reasons to cause the foreclosure crisis and what might be done to stop it. They focus
on two key decisions: the borrower’s choice to default on the mortgage and the lender’s choice
on whether to renegotiate or “modify” the loan. However, very little work has been done in
the above paper or elsewhere on the quantitative modeling of these strategies.
Ambrose and Buttimer [2] propose a discrete version of the Adjustable Balance Mortgage
(ABM), which allows the homeowner to pay a reduced mortgage payment if the house price
falls below the remaining value of the mortgage. However, the analysis is in discrete time
and is difficult to compare with the alternative approaches to be described here that are
carried out in the continuous time setting.
Our purpose is to use the simplest model, which is able to capture the phenomenon and
quantitatively study some of the strategies discussed in the two previous papers. Both
analytic approximations of the option price and default (foreclosure) probability are derived.
Moreover, the regime switching case is handled.
3.2.2 Contribution
In this second part of the dissertation, we explore two different ways to avoid mortgage
defaults when housing prices decline. First, we propose a new mortgage insurance contract
(American put option with the house as the underlying asset). Second, we price the ad-
justable balance mortgage in continuous time, in order to facilitate the comparison of the
two approaches and to make possible the calculation of probabilities of foreclosures.
The put problem has two essential differences from the more standard equity case. First, the
rate of the randomly priced stock (the underlier) is replaced by the house which the owner
can “sell” (exchange) at any time for the remaining value of the mortgage, M(t). More-
over, the house price has a regime switch from falling to rising values. The second essential
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difference is that the strike price of the option, M(t), is now a function of t.
3.3 MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF HOME FORECLOSURE
In this section we will develop a simplified mathematical model of the most common type of
foreclosure. Specifically, the homeowner stops paying the mortgage and vacates the house
the instant that the house price falls below the remaining value of the mortgage (i.e. is under-
water). Of course, there are many extenuating circumstances that preclude the homeowners
from foreclosing at this precise instant - e.g., employment, children’s schooling, availability
of alternative housing, etc. On the other hand, this ambiguity of the precise moment of
default arises, and is common, in many other situations: defaults of corporate bonds, credit
instruments and (as pointed out in the previous chapters) financial institutions. Another
simplification in our study is that the analysis will be carried out in the continuous time
setting rather than the monthly payment structure common to most mortgages. This will
make the analysis simpler and the results more transparent especially when we study the
early exercise boundaries and the first crossing problems that are key to our work.
3.3.1 Mathematical Models Of House Prices and Mortgage Values
We assume the homeowner has obtained a fixed rate mortgage (FRM) with rate c, and with
maturity T ∗ (say T ∗ is 30 years). This fixed rate mortgage satisfies the following differential
equation:
dM(t) = cM(t)dt−mdt, M(T ∗) = 0 (3.3.1)
where m is the continuous repayment rate. It follows that
d
(
e−ctM(t)
)
= −me−ctdt (3.3.2)
and integrating both sides from t to T ∗, we have
e−cT
∗
M(T ∗)− e−ctM(t) = −m
∫ T ∗
t
e−ctdt (3.3.3)
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Since M(T ∗) = 0, we have
−e−ctM(t) = m
c
(e−cT
∗ − e−ct) (3.3.4)
Thus
M(t) =
m
c
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.3.5)
with
M(0) =
m
c
(
1− e−cT ∗) (3.3.6)
or
m
c
=
M(0)
1− e−cT ∗ (3.3.7)
In summary,
M(t) =
m
c
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) = M(0)(1− e−c(T ∗−t)
1− e−cT ∗
)
(3.3.8)
Individual house prices are modeled by a Geometric Brownian Motion that satisfies a stochas-
tic differential equation of the form
dS = (r − δ(t))Sdt+ σ(t)SdW (t) (3.3.9)
where W (t) is a Brownian motion and the drift and volatility are given by step functions
δ(t) = δ1χ[0,Ts] + δ2χ[Ts,T ], δ2 < r < δ1 (3.3.10)
σ(t) = σ1χ[0,Ts] + σ2χ[Ts,T ] (3.3.11)
where Ts is the time the regime switches from falling prices to rising prices. Here χA is the
indicator function of the set {A} defined as χA(x) =
1 ifx ∈ A0 ifx 6∈ A .
We assume that individual house prices follow the average in the region (i.e., we will fit the
parameters in Equation 3.3.9 to the data in Table 8). To this end, we find, using standard
techniques [20], that δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.045767598, σ2 = 0.031712223 provide a
reasonable fit to the Zillow data and we take r = 0.05 and c = 0.06 from historical data.
One rather surprising observation is that the volatility is quite low in both the falling and
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Figure 8: Common type of default
rising house price regimes.
Figure 8 shows a single sample path, S(t), of Equation 3.3.9 (the jagged curve) with initial
house price normalized to 1 along with the remaining value of the mortgage, M(t), (the
smooth curve with the initial value of the mortgage, M(0) = 0.9; i.e. 90% of the house
price). The mathematical definition of the common type of default (foreclosure) described
above is
τ = inf {t > 0;S(t) ≤M(t)} (3.3.12)
Both the homeowner, and the mortgage company, are interested in the default probability
(probability of foreclosure) defined mathematically by P (τ ≤ t).
3.3.2 Probability Of Foreclosure
In this section we calculate the default probability defined above for the model (Equation
3.3.8 and 3.3.9). We accomplish this by rephrasing the problem as a first crossing problem
for Brownian motions [20].
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In phase 1, S(t) = S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)t+σ1W (t) so that S(t) ≤M(t) is equivalent to
S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)t+σ1W (t) ≤ M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.3.13)
σ1W (t) ≤ ln M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ1 − σ21
2
)t (3.3.14)
Explicit solutions to first crossing problems for Brownian motions are only known for lines;
i.e., P (W (t) ≤ A+Bt) [19]. To fit this requirement we approximate the term
ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) ≈ −e−c(T ∗−t) ≈ −e−cT ∗ect ≈ −e−cT ∗(1 + ct). This results in:
W (t) ≤ 1
σ1
{
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) − e
−cT ∗ −
(
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
+ ce−cT
∗
)
t
}
(3.3.15)
Suppose X(t) = µt+ σW (t), where W (t) is a Brownian Motion. We define the first passage
time that the process X(t) crosses the line y = b from above as
τ = inf {t > 0, X(t) ≤ b} = inf {t > 0, µt+ σW (t) ≤ b}
= inf
{
t > 0,W (t) ≤ b
σ
− µ
σ
t
}
= inf {t > 0,W (t) ≤ B + At}
(3.3.16)
where A = −µ
σ
and B = b
σ
.
The survival probability can be expressed in terms of its pdf [19].
P (τ > t) =
∫ +∞
B+At
u(x, t)dx (3.3.17)
where u(x, t) = 1√
2pit
[
e−
x2
2t − e−2ABe− (2B−x)
2
2t
]
. Thus
P (τ > t) =
1√
2pit
∫ +∞
B+At
e−
x2
2t dx− 1√
2pit
∫ +∞
B+At
e−2ABe−
(2B−x)2
2t dx
=
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
B√
t
+A
√
t
e−
y2
2 dy − 1√
2pi
e−2AB
∫ +∞
− B√
t
+A
√
t
e−
y2
2 dy
= N
(
− B√
t
− A√t
)
− e−2ABN
(
B√
t
− A√t
)
= N
(
− b
σ
√
t
+
µ
σ
√
t
)
− e 2bµσ2 N
(
b
σ
√
t
+
µ
σ
√
t
)
(3.3.18)
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where N is the normalized Gaussian CDF. Therefore, in phase 1 (i.e. when 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts), we
have
P (τ > t) = N
(
− b1
σ1
√
t
+
µ1
σ1
√
t
)
− e
2b1µ1
σ21 N
(
b1
σ1
√
t
+
µ1
σ1
√
t
)
(3.3.19)
where b1 = ln
M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗) − e
−cT ∗ and µ1 = r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
+ ce−cT
∗
In phase 2 (i.e. when Ts ≤ t ≤ T ) we have S(t) = S(Ts)e(r−δ2−
σ22
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts)
so that
S(t) = S(Ts)e
(r−δ2−σ
2
2
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts) ≤M(t) = M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.3.20)
is equivalent to(
r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
)
(t− Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ≤ ln M(0)
S(Ts) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.3.21)
Again, approximating ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) ≈ −e−c(T ∗−t) ≈ −e−cT ∗ect ≈ −e−cT ∗(1 + ct), this
inequality is approximated by
W (t− Ts) ≤ 1
σ2
{
ln
M(0)
S(Ts) (1− e−cT ∗) − e
−cT ∗ − cTse−cT ∗ − (r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
+ ce−cT
∗
)(t− Ts)
}
(3.3.22)
Therefore, in phase 2 with Ts ≤ t ≤ T , using Equation 3.3.19 in the first term below and
letting the random variable S(Ts) = y, we have
P (τ > t)
= P (τ > Ts)
(∫ +∞
M(Ts)
f(y)dy
)−1
∫ +∞
M(Ts)
{
N
(
− b2
σ2
√
t− Ts
+
µ2
σ2
√
t− Ts
)
− e
2b2µ2
σ22 N
(
b2
σ2
√
t− Ts
+
µ2
σ2
√
t− Ts
)}
f(y)dy
(3.3.23)
where f(y) = 1
σ1y
√
2piTs
e
−
(
ln
y
S(0)
−(r−δ1−
σ21
2 )Ts
)2
2σ21Ts is the transition probability density function
p(S(0), 0; y, Ts) for Geometric Brownian Motions [20], and the constants are given by
b2 = ln
M(0)
y(1−e−cT∗) − e
−cT ∗ − cTse−cT ∗ , µ2 = r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
+ ce−cT
∗
, and
M(Ts) =
M(0)
1−e−cT∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−Ts)).
The normalizing factor
(∫ +∞
M(Ts)
f(y)dy
)−1
is included to give a probability of 1 to the sample
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paths that survived to Ts.
Using the parameter values from the Zillow data in Equation 3.3.9 and 3.3.8, we calcu-
late numerically the survival probability P (τ > t) = 1−P (τ ≤ t) using Equation 3.3.19 and
3.3.23, and plot the results in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Survival probability for common foreclosure model. (Strike = M(t), r = 0.05, δ1 =
0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9, c =
0.06, T = 5, Ts = 3, T
∗ = 30)
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It is clear from Figure 9 that the probability of foreclosure begins to rapidly increase after
the first half-year and approaches 90% before house prices begin to rise at Ts = 3. After
Ts there is a very modest decrease in the survival probability, as anticipated, since house
prices have now begun to rise. However by this time a significant proportion of homeowners
would have foreclosed on their mortgage if they had followed the simple criterion that their
house value had fallen below the remaining value of their mortgage. As mentioned, this
would have a significant negative impact on the homeowner’s future credit rating and the
mortgage company would be forced to hold a non-performing mortgage as well as to acquire
a devalued house.
In the next section we will introduce two financial strategies to avoid, or reduce the frequency
of foreclosures of this type.
3.4 PUT OPTION ON THE MORTGAGE
The first strategy to reduce foreclosure frequency is to allow the homeowner to buy a put
option on his home allowing him (her) to sell (exchange) it for the remaining value of the
mortgage without future credit consequences. The amount the homeowner would pay upfront
for being able to legally walk away from his house and mortgage would be determined by
the mortgage company using risk-neutral pricing so that the financial risk of this type of
foreclosure is equally shared by the two parties.
3.4.1 The American Put Problem
American style put options are well known in the equity options literature. This instrument
gives the holder the right to sell any time in the future a stock for some constant value which
has been decided today. Our put has two essential differences from the equity case. First, the
rate of the randomly priced stock (the underlier) is replaced by the house which the owner
can “sell” (exchange) at any time for the remaining value of the mortgage, M(t). Moreover,
Equation 3.3.9 modeling this house price has a regime switch from falling to rising values.
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The second essential difference is that the strike price of the option, M(t), is now a function
of t.
All options will be priced using the Black-Scholes, risk-neutral formalism. We begin by
stating the mathematical problem for P , the price of the American put option. At maturity
of the put, say T = 5 years in the future, the intrinsic payoff is the difference between the
remaining mortgage value and the house price. But an American style option allows a person
to exercise at any time between the purchase of the option and its maturity. Thus we must
incorporate the optimal early exercise boundary B(t), namely, the value of the house price
dilutes below which it is optimal for the person who bought this put option to foreclose on
the house by exchanging it for the mortgage. Specifically the price, P , at time 0, for the
American put option to exchange the house for the remaining value of the mortgage satisfies
the Black-Scholes PDE [20].
Pt +
1
2
σ2(t)S2PSS + (r − δ(t))SPS − rP = 0, S > B(t), 0 < t < T (3.4.1)
P (B(t), t) = M(t)−B(t) (3.4.2)
PS(B(t), t) = −1 (3.4.3)
P (S, T ) = (M(T )− S)+ (3.4.4)
B(T ) = min
(
M(T ),
r
δ2
M(T )
)
(3.4.5)
Free boundary problems such as Equation 3.4.1 to Equation 3.4.5, even when δ(t), σ(t), and
M(t) are constants, do not have explicit solutions - they must be solved numerically. Fol-
lowing Carr, Jarrow, and Myneni [7] we obtain an integral representation for the price, PAm,
in terms of the unknown early exercise boundary, B(t). Essentially, the method decomposes
the value of an American put option into the corresponding European put price and the
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early exercise premium. In the non-regime switching case (δ, σ are constant, for example as
in phase 1), the Carr integral equation is [7]:
PAm(S, t) = PEu(S, t)
+
∫ T
t
(
me−c(T
∗−u) + rM(u)
)
e−r(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
S
)
− (r − δ − σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
− δS
∫ T
t
e−δ(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
S
)
− (r − δ + σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
(3.4.6)
where N(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
0
e−
z2
2 dz is the standard normal CDF. Here the variable strike appears
in the first integral.
The standard approach is to first solve for the early exercise boundary. This is accomplished
by evaluating Equation 3.4.6 on the boundary, i.e., by replacing S by B(t) and using Equa-
tion 3.4.2 to obtain a nonlinear integral equation for B(t). This generalizes Carr’s integral
equation when the strike is not constant, and as we shall see, it can be extended to the case
of interest here when δ(t) and σ(t) are functions of t. We then solve this integral equation
numerically to find the early exercise boundary B(t). Finally, B(t) can be inserted into
Equation 3.4.6 to obtain the values of PAm.
With this instrument, the mortgage holder will not necessarily default the minute his house
price goes below the mortgage value (as in the previous section), but rather will follow the
optimal strategy to see if S(t) drops below B(t).
On S = B(t) (approaching from the continuation region where the PDE holds and using
Equation 3.4.4), Equation 3.4.6 becomes
PAm(B(t), t) = M(t)−B(t) = PEu(B(t), t;M(T ), T )
+
∫ T
t
(
me−c(T
∗−u) + rM(u)
)
e−r(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
B(t)
)
− (r − δ − σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
− δB(t)
∫ T
t
e−δ(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
B(t)
)
− (r − δ + σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
(3.4.7)
We will solve this integral equation numerically (and ultimately incorporate the regime
switching as well). But in order to be confident that our numerical scheme gives correct
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results, we will first develop the code in the constant strike case, K = M(T ), and compare
our results with the existing results of Chen, Cheng, and Chadam [5].
For constant strike, Equation 3.4.7 reduces to
K −B(t) =PEu(B(t), t;M(T ), T )
+K
∫ T
t
re−r(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
B(t)
)
− (r − δ − σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
− δB(t)
∫ T
t
e−δ(u−t)N
(
1
σ
√
u− t
(
ln
(
B(u)
B(t)
)
− (r − δ + σ
2
2
)(u− t)
))
du
(3.4.8)
We will study Equation 3.4.8 for two sets of parameters: for r > δ (rising house prices), and
for r < δ (falling house prices) since for American put options, these two cases are different
at expiry [14]:
B(T ) =
K if δ ≤ rr
δ
K if δ ≥ r
(3.4.9)
An outline of the numerical scheme for B(t) follows. On [0, T ], solve the integral equation
for B(t) numerically, i.e. take 0 = t0 < t1 < ... < tn = T , with ∆t =
T
n
. Denote by Bk the
resulting numerical approximation for B(tk). Start with Bn = B(T ) =
K if δ ≤ rr
δ
K if δ ≥ r
At the first time step tn−1 = T − ∆t, we proceed as follows. Take B0n−1 = Bn = B(T )
as the initial guess. Then numerically solve for Bn−1 in the non-linear equation. We use
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right Riemann sums to approximate the two integrals. We have:
Bn−1 = K − PEu(Bn−1, tn−1;K,T )
−K
∫ tn
tn−1
re−r(u−tn−1)N
(
1
σ
√
u− tn−1
(
ln
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B(u)
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)
− (r − δ − σ
2
2
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(3.4.10)
At the second time step tn−2 = T − 2∆t, we use the initial guess B0n−2 = Bn−1, so we have:
Bn−2 = K − PEu(Bn−2, tn−2;K,T )
−K
∫ tn−1
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re−r(u−tn−2)N
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ln
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(3.4.11)
i.e.
Bn−2 =K − PEu(Bn−2, tn−2;K,T )
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(3.4.12)
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In general, at the jth time step tn−j = T − j∆t, we use the initial guess B0n−j = Bn−j+1 and
solve the equation:
Bn−j =K − PEu(Bn−j, tn−j;K,T )
−
j∑
s=1
Kre−rs∆tN
(
1
σ
√
s∆t
(
ln
(
Bn−j+s
B0n−j
)
− (r − δ − σ
2
2
)s∆t
))
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√
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(
ln
(
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)
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2
2
)m∆t
))
∆t
(3.4.13)
Following this procedure, we obtain the solution Bn−j at each time step tn−j. With suffi-
ciently small time steps, we can accurately approximate the optimal early exercise boundary
for the American put option.
In the regime switching case (two phases), during the second phase, we can calculate the
integral completely as above, but before the regime switching time Ts, the integrals must be
broken into two pieces each, and both values of the dividend rate, δ1 and δ2, will appear.
Specifically, in the regime switching case Equation 3.4.6 becomes
PAm(S, t) = PEu(S, t)
+
∫ T
Ts
(
me−c(T
∗−u) + rM(u)
)
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(3.4.14)
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On S = B(t), with constant strike K, we have:
K −B(t) = PEu(B(t), t;K,T )
+K
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(3.4.15)
This integral equation is solved numerically using a scheme similar to 3.4.13.
3.4.2 Numerical Validation Of The Scheme
The non-regime switching case with constant strike K, and with constant r > δ, is the well
studied standard case [7]. We present the numerical results with the following parameters:
S(0) = 1 (We normalize the house price to 1 and take the constant strike K = 0.8376 to
be the value of M(5) for a 6%, 30-year fixed rate mortgage, i.e., c = 0.06, T ∗ = 30 in 3.3.8
with the mortgage to house price ratio M(0) = 0.9); i.e., K = 0.8376; and the put option
maturity in years is T = 5; r = 0.05; δ = 0.03; σ = 0.2; dt = 1
200
(in year). Figure 10 shows
the perfect match of the scheme 3.4.13 with previous calculations using other methods [5].
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Figure 10: Comparison (with [5]) of the early exercise boundary for constant strike. (K =
0.8376, r = 0.05, δ = 0.03, σ = 0.2, dt = 0.005, T = 5)
39
We also carry out the calculations for falling house prices with r < δ. This is the case
where the boundary does not start at the strike K, but rather below the strike at r
δ
K.
Specifically, S(0) = 1; K = 0.8376; T = 5; r = 0.05; δ = 0.12; σ = 0.2; dt = 1
200
(in year).
In this case, at expiry the early exercise boundary begins at r
δ
K = 0.349 rather than at
K = 0.8376. Once again, our results match well. See Figure 11 for details.
Figure 11: Comparison (with [5]) of the early exercise boundary for constant strike. (K =
0.8376, r
δ
K = 0.349, r = 0.05, δ = 0.12, σ = 0.2, dt = 0.005, T = 5)
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Finally, in the regime switching case, with constant strike, we use the parameters: S(0) =
1; K = 0.8376; T = 5; Ts = 3 (Regime switching time, in years); r = 0.05; δ1 = 0.12;
δ2 = 0.03; σ = 0.2; dt =
1
200
(in year). From Ts = 3 to expiry, T = 5, the house prices
are rising because the dividend rate is 3% and the interest rate is 5%. In the earlier period,
0 ≤ t ≤ Ts = 3, (phase 1), when the house prices are falling, the dividend rate is 12%. From
Figure 12, one notices a jump in the early exercise boundary, B(t), at the regime switching
time due to the dividend rate change. Following the analysis of Jiang [14] the starting point
of the boundary at Ts is min
(
r
δ1
K,B(Ts+)
)
.
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Figure 12: Early exercise boundary for constant strike with regime switching. (K =
0.8376, r = 0.05, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ = 0.2, dt = 0.001, T = 5, Ts = 3)
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As a further check of our numerical method, we also compare the numerical and the-
oretical values of the asymptotic behavior (t → −∞) of the early exercise boundary. The
theoretical values are obtained as follows from the stationary version of the Black-Scholes
PDE 3.4.1:
S2PSS + (k − l)SPS − kP = 0, where k = 2r
σ2
, l =
2δ
σ2
(3.4.16)
Suppose P (S) = aSb, we have PS(S) = abS
b−1 and PSS(S) = ab(b−1)Sb−2, and substitution
into the asymptotic Equation 3.4.16 gives b(b−1)+(k− l)b−k = 0 or b2 +(k− l−1)b−k = 0
In order to satisfy the asymptotic condition P (S)→ 0 as S → +∞, we have:
b =
−(k − l − 1)−√(k − l − 1)2 + 4k
2
(3.4.17)
Denote the asymptotic value as t → −∞ by S∗. Since P (S∗) = K − S∗ and PS(S∗) = −1,
we have: a(S∗)b = K − S∗ and ab(S∗)b−1 = −1. Thus (1− 1
b
)S∗ = K, so S∗ = K
1− 1
b
.
Case 1: r = 0.05, δ = 0.12, σ = 0.2, T = 5, K = 0.8376, b = −0.5. Thus S∗ =
0.279214857. See Figure 13 for comparison with value obtained numerically using Equation
3.4.13, integrating back 100 years.
Case 2: r = 0.05, δ = 0.12, σ = 0.04577, T = 5, K = 0.8376, b = −0.69660102. Thus
S∗ = 0.34392533. See Figure 14 for comparison with value obtained numerically, integrating
back 100 years.
This, along with the earlier match with existing work [5], suggests that our numerical scheme
for solving these generalized Carr integral equations is accurate and robust over long times.
Notice that with smaller volatility (case 2) the numerical scheme captures the expected loss
of convexity of the early exercise boundary near expiry as discussed in [5].
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Figure 13: Early exercise boundary for constant strike. (K = 0.8376, r = 0.05, δ =
0.12, σ = 0.2, dt = 0.005, T = 5)
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Figure 14: Early exercise boundary for constant strike. (K = 0.8376, r = 0.05, δ =
0.12, σ = 0.04577, dt = 0.005, T = 5)
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With this confidence in the numerical scheme, we now apply it to the case where the
strike of the option M(t) is a function of t. For the full problem (regime switching, non-
constant strike case), we set the parameters as follows: S(0) = 1; T ∗ = 30 (Mortgage term,
in years); T = 5 (Put option maturity, in years); Strike M(t); Ts = 3 (Regime switching
time, in years); r = 0.05; δ1 = 0.12; δ2 = 0.03; σ1 = 0.045768; σ2 = 0.031712; c = 0.06;
Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9; dt = 1
1000
(in year). See Figure 15 for reference. Note that
the starting point of the boundary at Ts is min
(
r
δ1
M(Ts), B(Ts+)
)
.
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Figure 15: Early exercise boundary for non-constant strike with regime switching. (Strike=
M(t), r = 0.05, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, Mortgage To Price
Ratio = 0.9, c = 0.06, dt = 0.001, T = 5, Ts = 3, T
∗ = 30)
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We have now completed the first step - we have obtained the early exercise boundary for
this American put option with the house as the underlying asset and the remaining value of
the mortgage as the strike. Using this early exercise boundary, B(t) in Equation 3.4.6, we
now calculate the value of the American put option. In the next section, we shall calculate
the probability of exercising this option (the default probability while holding this put), in
both the non-regime switching (falling house prices) and the regime switching (falling fol-
lowed by rising house prices) case.
We first list the parameters that are common to each of the following cases: M(t) as the
strike, S(0) = 1, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.045767598,
σ2 = 0.031712223, ∆t = 0.005.
Case 1: Ts = 3, T = 5.
We find that the price of the American put option
PutAm(S(0) = 1, t = 0) = 0.024440186223318. Notice that in the calculation, since we
normalized the house price to 1, the option price is approximately 2.44% of the house price.
For example, for a $300,000 house, the option price is $7,332, which is reasonable for 5-year
default protection during a housing slump.
Case 2 (Earlier regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 2, T = 5.
We find that the price of the American put option
PutAm(S(0) = 1, t = 0) = 0.006420005766899. The price is significantly less since there is
(we shall find) reduced chance of foreclosing.
Case 3 (Later regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 4, T = 5.
We find that the price of the American put option
PutAm(S(0) = 1, t = 0) = 0.059429463973766.
Case 4 (Longer maturity for the American put option): Ts = 3, T = 10.
We find that the price of the American put option
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PutAm(S(0) = 1, t = 0) = 0.002294106101702. The price is significantly less than in Case 1
since there is reduced chance of foreclosing in the later years when the house price is rising.
3.4.3 Survival Probability When Holding The Put
As we mentioned earlier, when holding the put the foreclosure does not occur at the first
time the house price S(t) drops below the remaining value of the mortgage M(t) as in Section
3.3. Instead, it is optimal to exercise the put option (foreclose) the first time the house price
S(t) drops below the early exercise boundary B(t).
We now proceed to derive analytical approximations for the probability of this new type of
default. Let τ = inf {0 ≤ t ≤ T ;S(t) ≤ B(t)} and the default probability be P (τ < t). As in
Section 3.3.2, this calculation will be based on a first crossing problem for a Brownian motion
which requires linear boundaries for closed form solutions (see Section 3.3.2). Clearly from
Figure 15, the early exercise boundary in the full problem (regime switching and with strike
M(t)) can be fitted quite accurately with two linear curves. Recall that S(t) is a Geometric
Brownian Motion, which in phase 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts, is give by S(t) = S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)t+σ1W (t).
Suppose that B(t) ' d1 +m1t in this interval [0, Ts]. We would like to derive the distribution
of the default time
τ = inf {t > 0, S(t) ≤ d1 +m1t} (3.4.18)
The inequality in Equation 3.4.18 is equivalent to
W (t) ≤ 1
σ1
{
ln
(
d1
S(0)
)
− (r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
)t+ ln
(
1 +
m1
d1
t
)}
(3.4.19)
As mentioned earlier, closed form solutions are only available for the first crossing of Brown-
ian motions for linear boundaries, so we must make a further approximation of the last term
by ln
(
1 + m1
d1
t
)
≈ m1
d1
t. Thus we have that S(t) ≤ d1 +m1t is approximately equivalent to
W (t) ≤ 1
σ1
{
ln
(
d1
S(0)
)
−
(
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
− m1
d1
)
t
}
(3.4.20)
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Therefore, we may, approximate the survival probability by (see Section 3.3.2)
P (τ > t) =N
− ln
(
d1
S(0)
)
σ1
√
t
+
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
− m1
d1
σ1
√
t

− e
2(ln(
d1
S(0)
))(r−δ1−
σ21
2 −
m1
d1
)
σ21 N
 ln
(
d1
S(0)
)
σ1
√
t
+
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
− m1
d1
σ1
√
t

(3.4.21)
In phase 2, where Ts ≤ t ≤ T , we have, following the same procedure as in Equation 3.3.23
that, with S(Ts) = y, the inequality
S(t) = ye(r−δ2−
σ22
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts) ≤ d2 +m2t (3.4.22)
is approximately equivalent to
W (t− Ts) ≤ 1
σ2
{
ln
(
d2
y
)
+
m2
d2
Ts − (r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
− m2
d2
)(t− Ts)
}
(3.4.23)
Using the probability density function for Geometric Brownian Motion [20]:
p(S(0), 0; y, t) =
1
σy
√
2pit
e−
(
ln
y
S(0)
−(r−δ−σ22 )t
)2
2σ2t (3.4.24)
we have for Ts ≤ t ≤ T
P (τ > t)
= P (τ > Ts)
(∫ +∞
B(Ts−)
f(y)dy
)−1
∫ +∞
B(Ts+)
{
N
(
− b2
σ2
√
t− Ts
+
µ2
σ2
√
t− Ts
)
− e
2b2µ2
σ22 N
(
b2
σ2
√
t− Ts
+
µ2
σ2
√
t− Ts
)}
f(y)dy
(3.4.25)
where f(y) = 1
σ1y
√
2piTs
e
−
(
ln
y
S(0)
−(r−δ1−
σ21
2 )Ts
)2
2σ21Ts , b2 = ln
(
d2
y
)
+ m2
d2
Ts, µ2 = r− δ2− σ
2
2
2
− m2
d2
, and
the first term, P (τ > Ts) is obtained from Equation 3.4.21.
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3.4.4 Numerical Results
We now summarize the survival probabilities for various regime switching times. We first
list the parameters that are common to each of the following cases:
M(t) as the strike, S(0) = 1, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03,
σ1 = 0.045767598, σ2 = 0.031712223, ∆t = 0.005. These are precisely the same as the
values chosen to calculate the price of the put in the previous section.
Case 1: Ts = 3, T = 5
The fitted two linear lines of the boundaries are y = d1 + m1t = 0.453267902647709 −
0.0196794419974254t in phase 1 and y = d2+m2t = 0.894155483290446−0.0137327534483013t
in phase 2. The survival probability at time t = Ts = 3 is 0.243142604913139 and at
t = T = 5 is 0.195277070213198. We shall also graph the survival probability for the entire
region 0 ≤ t ≤ T = 5 in Figure 16 to come in order to compare it with the graph (Figure 9)
for the standard model of foreclosure.
Case 2 (Earlier regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 2, T = 5.
The fitted two linear lines of the boundaries are y = d1 + m1t = 0.457171309435733 −
0.0255660274385337t in phase 1 and y = d2+m2t = 0.893503685576692−0.013565982992112t
in phase 2. The survival probability at time t = Ts = 2 is 0.505398931247803 and at
t = T = 5 is 0.420855783775341.
Case 3 (Later regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 4, T = 5
The fitted two linear lines of the boundaries are y = d1 + m1t = 0.433845003862739 −
0.0130442885119474t in phase 1 and y = d2+m2t = 0.890854870903941−0.0129775183124687t
in phase 2. The survival probability at time t = Ts = 4 is 0.114005244670559 and at
t = T = 5 is 0.090886183515652.
Case 4 (Longer maturity for the American put option): Ts = 3, T = 10
The fitted two linear lines of the boundaries are y = d1 + m1t = 0.545736696123956 −
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0.0384185962334067t in phase 1 and y = d2+m2t = 0.909211930566617−0.0161231601401344t
in phase 2. The survival probability at time t = T = 10 is 0.165133842276781.
From the numerical results here and in Section 3.4.2, as the regime switching time increases
and the other parameters remain the same, the American put option price increases, and
the survival probability decreases. Intuitively, as the regime switching time gets longer, the
probability of the house price falling below the mortgage balance increases. As a result,
the put option is more valuable to the borrower and hence the price of the put increases
to compensate the lender for bearing the additional house price risk. The second result
evident in the numerical results is that as the American put option maturity increases and
other parameters keeping the same, the option price decreases, and the survival probability
decreases. In general we see that this optionality from holding the put is a reasonably priced
method to avoid adverse credit impacts from foreclosure.
The most significant result arises from comparing the survival probabilities for the simple
foreclosure model (Figure 9) with that when holding the put (Figure 16, to come). For this
calculation, using Equation 3.4.25, we choose the same parameters as for Figure 9: Ts = 3,
T = 5, M(t) as the strike, S(0) = 1, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03,
σ1 = 0.045767598, σ2 = 0.031712223, ∆t = 0.005.
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Figure 16: Survival probability for non-constant strike with regime switching. (Strike =
M(t), r = 0.05, δ1 = 0.12, δ2 = 0.03, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, Mortgage To Price
Ratio = 0.9, c = 0.06, dt = 0.005, T = 5, Ts = 3, T
∗ = 30)
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Figure 16 shows that if the homeowner follows the optimal strategy for exercising the
put, there is essentially no chance of foreclosing as compared to 90% in the standard model
summarized in Figure 9. When house prices begin to rise, the homeowner’s perception
changes to a longer horizon than the maturity of the put (T = 5). (S)he knows that
eventually the house price will rise above M(t) which is falling to zero at the mortgage
maturity, T ∗ = 30.
In summary, we have shown that the put option provides a reasonably priced strategy for
avoiding adverse credit impacts to the homeowner should (s)he decide to foreclose during
periods of falling house prices. Indeed, comparing Figure 9 and Figure 16, (s)he would
almost certainly not foreclose during the period of rapidly falling prices (0 ≤ t ≤ Ts = 3)
while holding the put as opposed to an almost certain foreclosure without the put. This
reduction in the frequency of foreclosures provides advantages for the mortgage company
as well. They would not be forced to hold a non-performing loan or to acquire a devalued
house.
3.5 ADJUSTABLE BALANCE MORTGAGE
3.5.1 Theoretical Derivation
At origination, the Adjustable Balance Mortgage (ABM) is like a Fixed-Rate Mortgage
(FRM) in that it has a fixed contract rate, has a maturity term and is fully amortizing. If
the house value is lower than the originally scheduled balance, the loan balance is set equal
to the house value, and the monthly payment is recalculated based on this new value. If
the house retains its initial value or increases in value, then the loan balance and payments
remain unchanged just as in a standard FRM. Ambrose and Buttimer [2] consider the ABM
in discrete time. Here we discuss the ABM in the continuous time case and compare it as
an alternative to the American put option discussed in the previous section.
We begin by summarizing the formulas for the standard FRM (see Equation 3.3.8):
M(t) =
m
c
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) = M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.5.1)
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Recall that for an ABM, if the house price is above the remaining value of the mortgage, the
mortgage holder pays the mortgage based on the remaining value of the mortgage, as in the
FRM case. However, if the house price falls below the remaining value of the mortgage, the
mortgage holder’s payment is based on the house price, so the payment is lower than the
FRM case. Thus for an ABM, Equation 3.5.1 is replaced by
M˜(t) =
M(t) =
m
c
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) = M(0)
1−e−cT∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) if S(t) ≥M(t)
S(t) if S(t) < M(t)
(3.5.2)
with the adjusted mortgage payment being
m˜(t) =
m if S(t) ≥M(t)at if S(t) < M(t) (3.5.3)
where at is the annualized mortgage payment calculated on the house price at time t (i.e.
atdt is paid in [t, t + dt]). Note that at is a constant during [t, t + dt] but it keeps changing
as S(t) changes. Comparing with Equation 3.5.1, we have:
S(t) =
at
c
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.5.4)
So
at =
S(t)c
1− e−c(T ∗−t) (3.5.5)
In order to compare the upfront values of the FRM and ABM, we calculate the discounted
cash flows between 0 to T , discounting at the rate c, of a T ∗ (say 30) year. For the FRM
this (deterministic) value is∫ T
0
e−ctmdt = m
∫ T
0
e−ctdt =
m
c
(
1− e−cT ) = M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−cT ) (3.5.6)
The corresponding calculation for the ABM is
EP
[∫ T
0
e−ctdm˜(t)
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
e−ct
{
mχ[S(t)≥M(t)] + atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
}
dt
]
= m
∫ T
0
e−ctEP
[
χ[S(t)≥M(t)]
]
dt+
∫ T
0
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
= m
∫ T
0
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
ce−ct
1− e−c(T ∗−t)EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
(3.5.7)
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The difference between Equation 3.5.6 and Equation 3.5.7 is the price that the mortgage
company would charge for this optionality.
i) Non-Regime Switching Case:
We first do the calculations in Equation 3.5.7 in the simple case with no regime switching.
As in Equation 3.3.14, the inequality
S(t) = S(0)e(r−δ−
σ2
2
)t+σW (t) ≥M(t) = M(0)
1−e−cT∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) is equivalent to
W (t) ≥ 1
σ
{
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ − σ2
2
)
t
}
(3.5.8)
Since W (t) ∼ N(0, t), we have:
P (S(t) ≥M(t))
= P
(
W (t) ≥ 1
σ
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ − σ2
2
)
t
])
= 1− P
(
W (t) ≤ 1
σ
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ − σ2
2
)
t
])
= 1− 1√
2pit
∫ 1
σ
[
ln
M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗)
+ln(1−e−c(T∗−t))−
(
r−δ−σ2
2
)
t
]
−∞
e−
x2
2t dx
(3.5.9)
Let z = x√
t
, then dx =
√
tdz, and Equation 3.5.9 becomes
P (S(t) ≥M(t))
= 1− 1√
2pi
∫ 1
σ
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗)
+ln(1−e−c(T∗−t))−
(
r−δ−σ2
2
)
t
]
−∞
e−
z2
2 dz
= 1−N
(
1
σ
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ − σ2
2
)
t
]) (3.5.10)
Next we calculate EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
using the known transition probability density func-
tion for a Geometric Brownian Motion [20].
EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
=
∫ +∞
0
yχ[y<M(t)]
1
σy
√
2pit
e−
(
ln
y
S(0)
−(r−δ−σ22 )t
)2
2σ2t dy
=
1
σ
√
2pit
∫ M(t)
0
e−
(
ln
y
S(0)
−(r−δ−σ22 )t
)2
2σ2t dy
(3.5.11)
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Let z =
ln y
S(0)
−(r−δ−σ2
2
)t
σ
√
t
, then dz = 1
σ
√
t
1
y
dy, and with y = S(0)eσ
√
tz+(r−δ−σ2
2
)t, we have:
EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
=
1√
2pi
∫ ln M(t)S(0) −(r−δ−σ22 )t
σ
√
t
−∞
ye−
z2
2 dz
=
S(0)√
2pi
e(r−δ−
σ2
2
)t
∫ ln M(t)S(0) −(r−δ−σ22 )t
σ
√
t
−∞
eσ
√
tz− z2
2 dz
=
S(0)√
2pi
e(r−δ−
σ2
2
)t
∫ ln M(t)S(0) −(r−δ−σ22 )t
σ
√
t
−∞
e−
(z−σ√t)2
2 e
σ2t
2 dz
=
S(0)√
2pi
e(r−δ)t
∫ ln M(t)S(0) −(r−δ−σ22 )t
σ
√
t
−∞
e−
(z−σ√t)2
2 dz
=
S(0)√
2pi
e(r−δ)t
∫ ln M(t)S(0) −(r−δ−σ22 )t
σ
√
t
−σ√t
−∞
e−
q2
2 dq
= S(0)e(r−δ)tN
(
ln M(t)
S(0)
− (r − δ − σ2
2
)t
σ
√
t
− σ√t
)
= S(0)e(r−δ)tN
(
ln M(t)
S(0)
− (r − δ + σ2
2
)t
σ
√
t
)
(3.5.12)
Therefore,
EP
[∫ T
0
e−ctdm˜(t)
]
= m
∫ T
0
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
ce−ct
1− e−c(T ∗−t)EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
= m
∫ T
0
e−ct
{
1−N
(
1
σ
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ − σ2
2
)
t
])}
dt
+ cS(0)
∫ T
0
e(r−δ−c)t
1− e−c(T ∗−t)N
(
ln M(t)
S(0)
− (r − δ + σ2
2
)t
σ
√
t
)
dt
(3.5.13)
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ii) Regime Switching Case:
In this case, the expression corresponding to Equation 3.5.7 is given by
EP
[∫ T
0
e−ctdm˜(t)
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
e−ct
{
mχ[S(t)≥M(t)] + atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
}
dt
]
=
∫ Ts
0
e−ctEP
[
χ[S(t)≥M(t)]
]
mdt+
∫ T
Ts
e−ctEP
[
χ[S(t)≥M(t)]
]
mdt
+
∫ Ts
0
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt+
∫ T
Ts
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
= m
∫ Ts
0
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt+m
∫ T
Ts
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt
+
∫ Ts
0
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt+
∫ T
Ts
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
= part1 + part2 + part3 + part4
(3.5.14)
We now calculate each of the four parts separately.
For part1 = m
∫ Ts
0
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt, P (S(t) ≥ M(t)) is simply a repeat of Equation
3.5.10 with δ = δ1 and σ = σ1.
P (S(t) ≥M(t))
= 1− 1√
2pi
∫ 1
σ1
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗)
+ln(1−e−c(T∗−t))−
(
r−δ1−σ
2
1
2
)
t
]
−∞
e−
z2
2 dz
= 1−N
(
1
σ1
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ1 − σ21
2
)
t
]) (3.5.15)
Therefore,
part1 = m
∫ Ts
0
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt
= m
∫ Ts
0
e−ct{
1−N
(
1
σ1
√
t
[
ln
M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ1 − σ21
2
)
t
])}
dt
(3.5.16)
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For part2 = m
∫ T
Ts
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt, we begin by calculating P (S(t) ≥M(t)) when
Ts ≤ t ≤ T .
S(t) = S(Ts)e
(r−δ2−σ
2
2
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts)
= S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)Ts+σ1W (Ts)e(r−δ2−
σ22
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts)
= S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)Ts+σ1W (Ts)+(r−δ2−σ
2
2
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts)
(3.5.17)
So S(t) ≥M(t) is equivalent to
S(0)e(r−δ1−
σ21
2
)Ts+σ1W (Ts)+(r−δ2−σ
2
2
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts) ≥ M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t)) (3.5.18)
which is equivalent to
σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ≥ ln M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ1 − σ21
2
)
Ts
−
(
r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
)
(t− Ts)
(3.5.19)
For Brownian motion, W (Ts) and W (t−Ts) are independent, since the time intervals [0, Ts]
and [Ts, t] are non-overlapping for Ts ≤ t ≤ T . We also know that W (Ts) ∼ N(0, Ts) and
W (t− Ts) ∼ N(0, t− Ts), so σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ∼ N(0, σ21Ts + σ22(t− Ts)). Thus
P (S(t) ≥M(t))
= P (σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ≥ ln M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))
−
(
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
)
Ts −
(
r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
)
(t− Ts))
= 1− P (σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ≤ ln M(0)
S(0) (1− e−cT ∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))
−
(
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
)
Ts −
(
r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
)
(t− Ts))
= 1− 1√
2pi
1√
σ21Ts + σ
2
2(t− Ts)
∫ UpperLimit1
−∞
e
− x2
2(σ21Ts+σ
2
2(t−Ts))dx
(3.5.20)
where
UpperLimit1 = ln
M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗) +ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))−(r − δ1 − σ212 )Ts−(r − δ2 − σ222 ) (t−Ts)
59
Let z = x√
σ21Ts+σ
2
2(t−Ts)
, then dx =
√
σ21Ts + σ
2
2(t− Ts)dz. Then
P (S(t) ≥M(t)) = 1− 1√
2pi
∫ UpperLimit2
−∞
e−
z2
2 dz = 1−N (UpperLimit2) (3.5.21)
where
UpperLimit2 =
1√
σ21Ts+σ
2
2(t−Ts)
×[
ln M(0)
S(0)(1−e−cT∗) + ln
(
1− e−c(T ∗−t))− (r − δ1 − σ212 )Ts − (r − δ2 − σ222 ) (t− Ts)]
Therefore,
part2 = m
∫ T
Ts
e−ctP (S(t) ≥M(t)) dt = m
∫ T
Ts
e−ct (1−N (UpperLimit2)) dt (3.5.22)
For part3, EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
is obtained from Equation 3.5.12 with δ = δ1 and σ = σ1.
Therefore,
part3 =
∫ Ts
0
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt =
∫ Ts
0
e−ctEP
[
χ[S(t)<M(t)]
cS(t)
1− e−c(T ∗−t)
]
dt
=
∫ Ts
0
e−ct
c
1− e−c(T ∗−t)EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
= cS(0)
∫ Ts
0
e(r−δ1−c)t
1− e−c(T ∗−t)N
 ln M(t)S(0) − (r − δ1 + σ212 )t
σ1
√
t
 dt
(3.5.23)
For part4, we have:
part4 =
∫ T
Ts
e−ctEP
[
atχ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt =
∫ T
Ts
e−ctEP
[
χ[S(t)<M(t)]
cS(t)
1− e−c(T ∗−t)
]
dt
=
∫ T
Ts
e−ct
c
1− e−c(T ∗−t)EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
dt
(3.5.24)
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In order to calculate EP
[
S(t)χ[S(t)<M(t)]
]
, we must first calculate the probability density
function for S(t) on [Ts, T ].
P (S(t) ≤ y) = P (S(0)e(r−δ1−σ
2
1
2
)Ts+σ1W (Ts)+(r−δ2−σ
2
2
2
)(t−Ts)+σ2W (t−Ts) ≤ y)
= P
(
σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ≤ ln y
S(0)
−
(
r − δ1 − σ
2
1
2
)
Ts −
(
r − δ2 − σ
2
2
2
)
(t− Ts)
)
(3.5.25)
Since σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ∼ N(0, σ21Ts + σ22(t− Ts)), we have:
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(3.5.26)
Let z = x√
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Thus the probability density function for S(t) on [Ts, T ] is:
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Therefore,
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In the next section we will use these expressions to calculate the upfront additional payment
for the ABM over the traditional FRM.
We now calculate the expectation of the ABM modified payment stream at.
Since
at =
S(t)c
1− e−c(T ∗−t) (3.5.32)
then
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In the regime switching case when 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts,
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We know that for a random variable X ∼ N(µ, σ2), the moment-generating function
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Therefore
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As discussed earlier, we know that X := σ1W (Ts) + σ2W (t− Ts) ∼ N(0, σ21Ts + σ22(t− Ts))
and hence
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(3.5.42)
We also note that the probability distribution for the time when the ABM is modified,
P (S(t) ≤M(t)), has already been calculated in Equation 3.5.15 and Equation 3.5.21.
3.5.2 Numerical Results
In order to compare the ABM optionality with the American put option, we list the ABM
results here, in both the non-regime switching case and the regime switching cases. In each
of the ABM cases, we compare them with the corresponding FRM result. First, we will list
the FRM result.
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3.5.2.1 FRM
We calculate the discounted value of a T ∗ year FRM cash flow between 0 to T (< T ∗) years,
discounting at rate c. Using Equation 3.5.6:
PV (0)FRM =
∫ T
0
e−ctmdt =
M(0)
1− e−cT ∗
(
1− e−cT ) (3.5.43)
with the parameters S(0) = 1; T ∗ = 30 (Mortgage term, in years); T = 5 (Maturity, in
years); r = 0.05; c = 0.06; Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9, we obtain
PV (0)FRM = 0.279457638302964 (3.5.44)
3.5.2.2 ABM
i) Non-Regime Switching Case
Using Equation 3.5.13
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(3.5.45)
With the parameters above augmented with those for the house price in phase 1: S(0) = 1;
T ∗ = 30 (Mortgage term, in years); T = 5 (Maturity, in years); r = 0.05; δ = 0.12;
σ = 0.045767598; c = 0.06; Mortgage To Price Ratio= 0.9, we obtain
PV (0)ABM = 0.263975139455276 (3.5.46)
Note that the result is less than for the FRM, as expected, since the house price is decreas-
ing (µ = r − δ = −0.07). A person should pay 0.279457638302964 − 0.263975139455276 =
0.015482498847688 percent of the house price upfront to hold this option during a housing
decline.
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In order to visualize the ABM present value with respect to the dividend rate (r − δ is
the rate of decline of house price), we plot Figure 17. As expected, when the house price
begins to decline the ABM price begins to differ from the FRM price.
Figure 17: ABM Present Value At Time 0 From 0 to 5 years, Non-RS Case. (S(0) = 1, T ∗ =
30, T = 5, r = 0.05, σ = 0.045768, c = 0.06, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9)
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ii) Regime Switching Case
In order to compare the ABM present value in the non-regime switching and regime switching
cases, we simultaneously plot in Figure 18 the ABM present values for variable δ1 throughout
0 ≤ t ≤ T = 5 (blue curve as in Figure 17) and with variable δ1 in phase 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ Ts = 3
followed by δ2 = 0.03 for rising prices in phase 2, Ts ≤ t ≤ T (red curve). As shown in the
graph, the regime switching ABM present value is always equal to or higher than that in the
non-regime switching case, due to the house price increase in phase 2.
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Figure 18: ABM Present Value At Time 0 From 0 to 5 years, Non-RS vs RS. (S(0) = 1, T ∗ =
30, T = 5, r = 0.05, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, δ2 = 0.03, c = 0.06, Mortgage To Price
Ratio = 0.9)
68
In order to compare the ABM strategy with the American put option case, we pick a
similar set of parameters in four cases as follows.
We list together here the parameters that are common to each of the following cases: S(0) =
1; T ∗ = 30 (Mortgage term, in years); r = 0.05; δ1 = 0.12; δ2 = 0.03; σ1 = 0.045767598;
σ2 = 0.031712223; c = 0.06; Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9;
Case 1: Ts = 3, T = 5
PV (0)ABMRS = 0.270517288796984 (3.5.47)
Note that the result is higher than the non-regime switching case since house prices rise in the
last 2 years. A person should pay 0.279457638302964−0.270517288796984 = 0.00894034950598
percent of the house price upfront for this option. If the mortgage company received
0.015482498847688 (based on assuming falling house prices for the entire T = 5 years) and
this regime switching happens, the mortgage company would profit by 0.015482498847688−
0.00894034950598 = 0.006542149341708.
Case 2 (Earlier regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 2, T = 5
PV (0)ABMRS = 0.276084080324638 (3.5.48)
Case 3 (Later regime switch from falling to rising house prices): Ts = 4, T = 5
PV (0)ABMRS = 0.265723482726580 (3.5.49)
Case 4 (Longer maturity for the American put option): Ts = 3, T = 10
PV (0)ABMRS = 0.474958294680668 (3.5.50)
Notice that when T = 10, the corresponding FRM present value at time 0 for the cash flow
from 0 to T is 0.486484948666481.
Finally, we plot the expectation of the payment stream at with respect to time t in regime
switching case (Figure 19) and P (S(t) ≤M(t)) (Figure 20).
69
Figure 19: Expectation of at, Regime Switching Case. (S(0) = 1, T
∗ = 30, T = 5, r =
0.05, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, c = 0.06, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9)
70
Figure 20: P (S(t) ≤ M(t)), Regime Switching Case. (S(0) = 1, T ∗ = 30, T = 5, r =
0.05, σ1 = 0.045768, σ2 = 0.031712, c = 0.06, Mortgage To Price Ratio = 0.9)
Thus we see that there is a high probability that during the end period of declining house
prices and the beginning of the housing rebound, the holder of an ABM will see a reduction
in mortgage payments of as much as 10 to 15 percent.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
In the first part of this work we studied the defaults of regional banks due to the housing
crisis. Using the publicly available quarterly reports of approximately 6,000 U.S. regional
banks, we were able to construct a robust cautionary index that effectively predicted the
defaulting banks over 6-month and 1-year time horizons. We provided a PD calculation
method for privately-held U.S. regional banks using free and transparent data from the
FDIC. We cleaned the data, and applied a bidirectional stepwise logistic regression model
to choose the most important predictors at each quarter t. In order to check the predictive
power, we apply the estimated coefficients from quarter t to quarter t + 1. We then assess
the goodness-of-fit of the model by three summary measures at each quarter: Area Under
the ROC Curve, KS Statistic, and Bad Capture Rate in the Bottom Percentile. The results
are shown to be very good for all quarters.
In the second part of this work we studied two strategies for reducing the frequency of home
foreclosure (mortgage payment defaults) during the recent housing crisis. In this analysis
house prices were modeled by geometric Brownian Motions with time dependent drift and
volatility. In an idealized setting, a model foreclosure occurs the first time that the house
prices falls below the remaining part of the mortgage. We show that this would occur with
very high probability for the data we studied. This would result in very serious credit
consequences to many homeowners. To avoid this negative credit impact, the homeowner
could purchase a put option allowing him to legally exchange the devalued house for the
mortgage with no legal consequences. For the data supplied, we found that this would be a
reasonably priced instrument and, more interestingly, that the homeowner would likely not
foreclose because (s)he would have had the opportunity to see the housing market begin to
rise beforehand. We also studied an alternate strategy, the adjustable balance mortgage,
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that reduces the mortgage payment when the house price falls below the remaining part of
the mortgage. If the reduced payment is calculated on the house price, we found this to be
a reasonably priced alternative to encourage homeowners not to foreclose.
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5.0 FUTURE WORK
Our work on regional bank defaults suggests that the original objective of identifying a dy-
namic index for which default arises as a first crossing problem might be unrealistic. On the
other hand, some more complicated variant of this structural model setting, similar to those
appearing in credit markets [13], might be more appropriate.
Several projects are suggested from the present work on mortgage defaults. One straight-
forward exercise would be to check the accuracy of our approximating analytic formulas for
the probabilities of default by using Monte Carlo simulations [12] with the exact boundaries.
Another would be to redo the calculations in the framework when the time of the regime
switch, Ts, is random [4]. Finally, it would be interesting to obtain Zillow data on those prices
and incidence of mortgage foreclosures from other geographical locations and to assess how
well our models fit after homeowner’s personal (non-financial) preferences are removed.
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Table 4: Stepwise logistic regression coefficients summary: 1 year default time horizon
Start
Quarter t
beta 0 TR EC/A CREL/A CL/A CIL/A GS/A NIM NI/A
2008.3.31 0.794 -0.449 8.665 -0.643 -118.770
p value 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000
2008.6.30 0.334 1.804 -0.538 5.847 -6.216 -19.739
p value 0.778 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.022
2008.9.30 -2.822 2.009 -0.368 6.309 -44.389
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2008.12.31 -0.265 0.713 -0.662 6.550 -36.514
p value 0.647 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
2009.3.31 4.358 -0.864 7.094 -5.575 -0.623 -66.124
p value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
2009.6.30 0.815 0.511 -0.576 2.482 5.527 -4.125 -0.402 -37.086
p value 0.354 0.015 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.029 0.008 0.000
2009.9.30 1.020 0.903 -0.779 3.766 -17.422
p value 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.013
2009.12.31 0.920 0.734 -0.816 -4.449 -24.276
p value 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.000
2010.3.31 1.519 0.667 -0.887
p value 0.047 0.000 0.000
2010.6.30 0.580 0.685 -0.804 -34.749
p value 0.485 0.000 0.000 0.012
2010.9.30 0.415 -0.875 7.575 -32.031
p value 0.593 0.000 0.002 0.001
2010.12.31 0.316 0.523 -0.927 6.430 6.971
p value 0.707 0.007 0.000 0.043 0.015
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Table 5: Stepwise logistic regression coefficients summary: 1 year default time horizon (Con-
tinued)
Start
Quarter t
beta 0 TR EC/A CREL/A CL/A CIL/A GS/A NIM NI/A
2011.3.31 0.441 -1.000 7.967 8.814 -9.033 -104.500
p value 0.647 0.000 0.034 0.006 0.018 0.001
2011.6.30 4.327 -0.993 -8.321 -34.791
p value 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.025
2011.9.30 1.589 -1.043 -51.385
p value 0.070 0.000 0.000
2011.12.31 1.040 0.367 -1.004 -24.441
p value 0.293 0.024 0.000 0.019
2012.3.31 1.927 0.404 -1.317 9.631
p value 0.055 0.032 0.000 0.036
2012.6.30 0.407 -1.027
p value 0.703 0.000
2012.9.30 -2.113 0.493 -0.948 5.537 -83.515
p value 0.151 0.031 0.000 0.028 0.000
2012.12.31 -2.342 -0.940 6.296 -47.334
p value 0.116 0.000 0.010 0.002
2013.3.31 -1.890 -1.037 12.748 -96.013
p value 0.252 0.000 0.007 0.019
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Table 6: Stepwise logistic regression coefficients summary: 6 months default time horizon
Start
Quarter t
beta 0 TR EC/A CREL/A CL/A CIL/A GS/A NIM NI/A
2008.3.31 1.895 -1.026 8.018 -18.458
p value 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.048
2008.6.30 -2.583 1.643 -0.450 -15.162 -31.249
p value 0.121 0.002 0.018 0.028 0.001
2008.9.30 -2.431 1.773 -0.597 -25.873
p value 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000
2008.12.31 -1.145 0.599 -0.642 4.397 -22.407
p value 0.200 0.024 0.000 0.017 0.000
2009.3.31 1.866 -0.724 5.558 -0.709 -55.145
p value 0.013 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
2009.6.30 -0.278 -0.573 3.508 -8.228 -41.131
p value 0.756 0.000 0.046 0.016 0.000
2009.9.30 2.154 -0.966 3.571 -14.037
p value 0.003 0.000 0.041 0.050
2009.12.31 -1.260 0.451 -0.765 5.501 -26.103
p value 0.106 0.002 0.000 0.030 0.000
2010.3.31 2.269 0.570 -1.190 -6.814 -42.666
p value 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.043 0.034
2010.6.30 3.785 -1.470
p value 0.000 0.000
2010.9.30 -0.483 0.462 -1.026 10.035
p value 0.660 0.009 0.000 0.013
2010.12.31 -0.813 0.889 -1.002 8.604
p value 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.029
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Table 7: Stepwise logistic regression coefficients summary: 6 months default time horizon
(Continued)
Start
Quarter t
beta 0 TR EC/A CREL/A CL/A CIL/A GS/A NIM NI/A
2011.3.31 1.026 -1.525 5.260
p value 0.325 0.000 0.016
2011.6.30 1.077 -1.545 13.086
p value 0.271 0.000 0.010
2011.9.30 1.166 -1.526
p value 0.221 0.000
2011.12.31 0.209 -1.514 -33.309
p value 0.849 0.000 0.009
2012.3.31 3.156 -1.648
p value 0.008 0.000
2012.6.30 0.576 -1.389 -80.551
p value 0.575 0.000 0.010
2012.9.30 -1.392 -1.675
p value 0.559 0.006
2012.12.31 -0.510 -2.497
p value 0.775 0.001
2013.3.31 -0.295 -1.335 6.992 -100.135
p value 0.816 0.000 0.015 0.044
2013.6.30 -2.785 -1.108 -138.504
p value 0.156 0.003 0.001
2013.9.30 1200.300
p value 0.913
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Table 8: Average monthly house prices in Paradise, Las Vegas
1997-07 109,800 2000-09 130,600 2003-11 171,700 2007-01 285,700 2010-03 126,300
1997-08 110,400 2000-10 131,700 2003-12 176,300 2007-02 284,500 2010-04 125,000
1997-09 110,800 2000-11 132,700 2004-01 180,500 2007-03 281,700 2010-05 123,800
1997-10 111,400 2000-12 133,300 2004-02 184,900 2007-04 277,800 2010-06 122,600
1997-11 112,200 2001-01 134,000 2004-03 192,900 2007-05 273,000 2010-07 121,500
1997-12 113,100 2001-02 135,000 2004-04 204,200 2007-06 269,400 2010-08 120,200
1998-01 113,800 2001-03 135,600 2004-05 216,700 2007-07 268,600 2010-09 119,000
1998-02 114,400 2001-04 135,700 2004-06 229,200 2007-08 266,400 2010-10 118,400
1998-03 114,600 2001-05 136,400 2004-07 238,500 2007-09 260,300 2010-11 117,400
1998-04 114,600 2001-06 137,500 2004-08 244,400 2007-10 252,200 2010-12 115,300
1998-05 114,600 2001-07 138,700 2004-09 248,200 2007-11 244,600 2011-01 112,300
1998-06 114,500 2001-08 139,700 2004-10 250,400 2007-12 242,200 2011-02 110,600
1998-07 114,200 2001-09 140,400 2004-11 251,000 2008-01 239,600 2011-03 110,000
1998-08 114,200 2001-10 140,700 2004-12 253,100 2008-02 232,000 2011-04 109,100
1998-09 114,400 2001-11 141,300 2005-01 257,100 2008-03 224,100 2011-05 107,300
1998-10 114,500 2001-12 141,500 2005-02 261,500 2008-04 221,700 2011-06 106,100
1998-11 114,900 2002-01 141,400 2005-03 264,400 2008-05 217,500 2011-07 105,100
1998-12 115,800 2002-02 141,700 2005-04 266,600 2008-06 209,600 2011-08 103,900
1999-01 117,100 2002-03 142,700 2005-05 267,800 2008-07 201,400 2011-09 102,800
1999-02 117,900 2002-04 143,300 2005-06 268,300 2008-08 195,600 2011-10 102,200
1999-03 118,100 2002-05 143,500 2005-07 269,600 2008-09 191,000 2011-11 101,600
1999-04 118,300 2002-06 143,200 2005-08 272,900 2008-10 184,600 2011-12 100,800
1999-05 118,900 2002-07 143,600 2005-09 278,000 2008-11 177,400 2012-01 100,600
1999-06 119,600 2002-08 144,600 2005-10 284,400 2008-12 169,000 2012-02 101,000
1999-07 120,500 2002-09 146,000 2005-11 N/A 2009-01 161,800 2012-03 101,300
1999-08 121,300 2002-10 147,500 2005-12 289,200 2009-02 155,900 2012-04 101,400
1999-09 122,500 2002-11 149,200 2006-01 290,600 2009-03 150,500 2012-05 102,100
1999-10 123,500 2002-12 150,600 2006-02 292,300 2009-04 144,300 2012-06 103,800
1999-11 123,600 2003-01 151,800 2006-03 295,500 2009-05 140,500 2012-07 105,600
1999-12 124,100 2003-02 152,900 2006-04 296,300 2009-06 136,600 2012-08 107,200
2000-01 125,600 2003-03 153,800 2006-05 294,700 2009-07 132,400 2012-09 109,000
2000-02 126,400 2003-04 154,600 2006-06 293,000 2009-08 129,200 2012-10 111,600
2000-03 126,400 2003-05 155,400 2006-07 291,400 2009-09 127,600 2012-11 114,300
2000-04 126,800 2003-06 156,600 2006-08 289,700 2009-10 126,000 2012-12 116,800
2000-05 127,700 2003-07 158,400 2006-09 288,600 2009-11 125,300 2013-01 118,800
2000-06 128,600 2003-08 160,700 2006-10 287,700 2009-12 125,100 2013-02 121,600
2000-07 128,900 2003-09 163,700 2006-11 286,100 2010-01 125,600 2013-03 124,600
2000-08 129,500 2003-10 167,600 2006-12 285,600 2010-02 126,400
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